The present invention relates generally to computer based voting applications, and more specifically, to a computer network based conditional voting system.
Systems for voting have existed since human beings started counting raised hands. This ancient approach did not allow for secrecy, and required that everyone in a group voting had to be at the same place at the same time. Later, the secret ballot and ballot box provided secrecy and freedom from voting at a fixed time, but still required that voters congregate at a specific place. Computer networks that reach individuals wherever they may be, through desktop, portable and hand-held input/output devices (e.g. keyboards and displays), later allowed votes to be cast by voters anywhere, without the need to congregate in one place.
All of these systems, including the modern, computer based ones, make use of very simple ballots. These ballots offer voters a limited choice, typically of one or more of the following: 1) vote Yes or No, and sometimes Indifferent and/or Abstain; 2) select one or more of multiple choices from a list; 3) write-in a desired selection; or 4) prioritize a list of alternatives.
These conventional alternatives can limit the ability of a group to make the best decision, or limit the voters from expressing their true preferences. Specifically, the conventional systems do not allow users' votes to be conditional on the votes of other members of the group. The following examples illustrate a few of the shortcomings of conventional voting systems.
Example 1. Person A may not be well informed on the issue, but knows that person B is, and has a high degree of confidence in person B's judgment. Person A may therefore wish to vote "the same as B votes", whether or not A knows what B's vote is. In traditional voting systems, the only way A can vote with B is to consult with B before the vote takes place to find out how B is voting. But if B should change his vote at the last moment, or if A has no way of contacting B, or if B has not yet decided his vote when A and B are able to discuss the matter, then A cannot guarantee that his vote is the same as B's. As a further example, A may wish to vote the way the "majority of B, C and D vote". In this example, the communication and logistical problems are three times as complicated as A merely voting with B.
Example 2. Person A's primary goal may be to support the position of a person B (perhaps the employer or spouse of person A). A may therefore choose to vote whichever way B votes on a wide variety of matters. To achieve this end with conventional voting systems, A would need to consult with B on every single matter, a time-consuming and perhaps impossible requirement.
Example 3. Persons A and B have agreed to trade votes on different issues. On issues 1, 3, 5, and 7, A will vote the same way as B. On issues 2, 4, 6, and 8, B will vote the same way as A. Again, to achieve this end with conventional voting systems, extensive and time-consuming coordination between A and B would be required.
Example 4. Person A's primary goal is to support the majority's view. Person A may therefore choose to vote whichever way the majority votes. To achieve this end with conventional voting systems, A must either guess or conduct a poll of other voters before the vote, either of which could be inaccurate or could change, to assess the majority's vote before the voting takes place.
Example 5. Person A does not particularly support an issue, but would vote in favor of it if all of persons B, G, M, P, S, W, and Z voted in favor of it. To achieve this end with conventional voting systems, would require contacting all of those individuals before the voting took place. (This example is similar to the majority of B, C and D in example 1 above.)
Example 6. The cost per person of a proposed shared asset, such as a new road or public library, is inversely proportional to the number of persons who help fund the proposed asset. Person A likes the proposal, whose overall cost is $10,000, but is only willing or able to pay up to $200 for it. There are 100 people in the group; those who support the proposal will share its cost equally. Person A would therefore vote in favor of the proposal if and only if at least 50% of the group (any 50 out of 100 people) ended up supporting the proposal ($10,000/50=$200). Each of the other 99 members of the group similarly have their own budget limitations, for example, person B is willing to pay no more than $150, and person C, no more than $125. To identify who is in the supporting group, and whether a solution is even possible, is a complex process with conventional voting systems.
Example 6 above is a case of what is more generally called the "common goods" problem. Conventional voting systems are particularly inadequate for these problems. "Common goods", such as public parks, libraries, a clean environment, labor unions, lighthouses, fire departments, or a counter-attack on a belligerent aggressor nation, are beneficial to all, but all have some cost. "Common goods" can be abused by "free riders". A "free rider" is someone or something that enjoys the benefit of the common good without helping to pay for it.
With conventional voting systems, it is often difficult to get people to pay for common goods. There is an incentive for people to wait until others pay for the goods, and then enjoy it as free riders. Consequently, beneficial measures are often postponed or not taken while people or countries wait for others to act. People need the ability to say: "I support this measure if and only if `X` percentage or more of the group will support it," or "I support this measure if all of persons A, B, C, D and E support it". Different members of the group will have different preferences. One person may require 80% of the group's support to support the measure; someone else may require only 50%; someone else, 90%.